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Chapter 11
Turning Assets into Cash: Problems and
Prospects in the Reverse Mortgage
Market
Andrew Caplin

Academic writers have long expressed enthusiasm regarding the potential
of the reverse mortgage market to help the elderly turn housing equity into
cash. Yet this market is tiny in the United States, and virtually nonexistent
in other developed nations. This chapter explores some of the economic
forces that may help to explain the gap between the current market and its
theoretical potential, including transactions costs, moral hazard, and consumer uncertainty about future preferences. In addition we evaluate psychological forces that may help explain lack of enthusiasm among homeowners for these products. We also focus attention on impediments to
market development attributable to the legal, regulatory, and tax systems. It
is likely that similar inertial forces may constrain the supply of a far broader
class of innovative ﬁnancial contracts. These include equity insurance products proposed by Case et al. (∞ΩΩ≥) and equity participation products proposed by Caplin et al. (∞ΩΩπ). These are all examples of schemes in which
there is some shifting of risk and return from the homeowner to the broader
ﬁnancial community. We outline some of the policy measures that may be
required if policymakers wish to encourage development of any or all of
these markets.

The Current Status of the Reverse Annuity Market
In the United States, reverse mortgages are the most important product in
the market for home equity conversion. Reverse mortgages have advantages
over more standard home equity loans, since many elderly households
would fail to qualify for the latter due to low income. The reverse mortgage
never requires a homeowner to make interest payments, and only becomes
due when the owner moves out of the house or dies.
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The most important and long-lived reverse mortgage currently on the
market is the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) offered by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This has been
available since ∞Ω∫Ω, when Congress authorized a HUD pilot program with
≤,∑≠≠ reverse mortgages. Authorization was increased to ≤∑,≠≠≠ in the early
∞ΩΩ≠s, and it was increased again in ∞ΩΩ∏.
Federal involvement goes far beyond authorizing the program, since it
includes an intricate set of cross-subsidies. The Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) agreed at the outset to purchase HECM loans
originated by approved lenders, subject to some minor conditions. In addition, HUD has offered a wide array of insurance guarantees on HECM loans
at a hard-to-beat price. Given the potential costs of these guarantees, HUD
retains strong controls on the various lenders who have been approved to
originate these mortgages. In addition, HUD insists that counseling be provided to borrowers who apply for HECM loans.
In addition to the HECM, a second important type of reverse mortgage is
the HomeKeeper, offered by Fannie Mae since ∞ΩΩ∑. While this product is
still primarily a creature of federal policy, there have been private companies
offering reverse mortgages. The Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation not only offers its own proprietary reverse mortgage, but has also
successfully issued the ﬁrst secondary market product in the history of the
reverse mortgage market. In ∞ΩΩΩ, Lehman Brothers issued $≥∞π million in
bonds against Financial Freedom’s portfolio of reverse mortgages. Not surprisingly, these private sector products are designed to appeal to higher
wealth home owners who are not well catered to in the federal programs.
The various reverse mortgage products have similar structural features.
When a homeowner meets the appropriate criteria, the ﬁnancial institution
offers a loan that can be taken as a lump sum, as an income stream, or as a
line of credit, with various degrees of ﬂexibility permitted between methods
of borrowing. The income stream can be taken either for a ﬁxed term or as
an annuity. There are various costs involved in taking out the loans, which
can be ﬁnanced in part from loan proceeds. The amount of money that can
be borrowed depends on the age of the borrower, the value of the house,
and some interest rate variables. We describe the HECM in greater detail to
clarify the fundamental economic forces at work.
In order to qualify for a HECM loan, a household head must be age ∏≤ or
older, and either own his home free and clear, or at least be able to pay off all
remaining debt with the proceeds of the loan. There are additional requirements that relate to the condition of the property at the time of purchase,
and also to the need to undergo some counseling on the nature of the
product. Once the household qualiﬁes, an initial ‘‘principal limit factor’’
is set, determining the maximum loan available to the borrower. As time
passes, the limit factor grows according to a formula based on interest rates
and certain ongoing insurance costs.
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The principal limit factor on a new loan is determined by a ﬁxed function
that depends only on the age of the youngest borrower, and two additional
numbers that are themselves determined by reasonably simple algorithms.
The ﬁrst number is the ‘‘adjusted property value’’ or maximum claim
amount, which is the minimum of the appraised value of the house and the
maximum loan in the FHA ≤≠≥(b) program. The second number is the
‘‘expected average mortgage interest rate,’’ which historically has been between ∞.∑ and ∞.π percent above the one-year Treasury bond rate. More
generally, interest charges for HECM borrowers are somewhat intricate.
The interest costs on outstanding balances follow a variable rate pattern,
with limits both on the rate at which the interest costs can change within a
year and over the life of the product. The expected average mortgage interest rate used in the calculation of the initial principal limit factor is generally
higher than the contemporaneous adjustable rate of interest, in an effort to
take account of the long term of the loan. A ﬁnal complication is that the
term of the loan itself may be impacted by future interest rates, since it may
be advantageous to reﬁnance a HECM should the rate of interest drop
signiﬁcantly.
The single most important determinant of the principal limit factor is
the age of the youngest borrower.∞ For a house with an appraised value of
$∞∑≠,≠≠≠ and with expected interest rate of ∫ percent per annum, the initial
principal limit factor increases from roughly $∑≠,≠≠≠ at age ∏∑, to $π≠,≠≠≠ at
age π∑, to $∞≠∑,≠≠≠ at age Ω≠ (Scholen ∞ΩΩ∏). At an interest rate of Ω percent
per annum, the corresponding numbers are $∂≠,≠≠≠ at age ∏∑, $∏≠,≠≠≠ at
age π∑, and $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ at age Ω≠. As the loan ages, the principal limit factor
grows at a rate that exceeds the expected interest rate by ≠.∑ percent. The
additional ≠.∑ percent reﬂects a monthly insurance fee that is charged on
HECM loan balances. This monthly fee is in addition to an up-front insurance fee amounting to two percent of the adjusted property value.
This premium serves in part to provide a guarantee to the borrower
against lender default, but in fact this risk is negligible in the current market, since Fannie Mae owns most of the loans. The more serious risk that
HUD bears concerns the growth in the principal limit factor over time.
There is ‘‘crossover risk,’’ which is realized when the principal limit factor
exceeds around Ω≠ percent of the house value. When one bears in mind
transactions costs, the homeowner is left with no equity in the house. From
this point on, it is clear that the lender might be unable to recover the full
amount owed. To prevent this risk from discouraging lenders, HUD allows
them to assign a mortgage to the FHA when the balance has risen to Ω∫
percent of the maximum claim amount. Following assignment, the leader
ﬁles an insurance claim for an amount equal to the mortgage balance and
has no further obligations. The Department continues to make payments
that are owed the borrower, and it accepts full responsibility in case of loss.
In addition to insurance costs, there are a wide variety of other tax and
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transaction costs involved in taking out a HECM. In its report to Congress
evaluating the HECM insurance program HUD found that actual transactions costs had averaged roughly $∂,∑≠≠ per loan, excluding insurance costs.
These numbers are very high when counted against the median adjusted
property value of $Ωπ,≠≠≠, and even more so against the median initial
principal limits of $∂π,≠≠≠. If we include the two percent up front insurance
fee, the average cost of taking out a reverse mortgage amounted to some
$∏,∑≠≠, or almost ∞∂ percent of the initial loan.
In addition to characterizing the various transactions costs, the ∞ΩΩ∑
HUD report also detailed the basic economic characteristics of a large random sample of the early users of the product. The ﬁndings are as one would
expect in most respects. The median age of HECM borrowers at closing was
π∏, well above the average age of all eligible households. The median property value was $∞≠≤,≠≠≠, as opposed to $π≠,∂∞∫ for all elderly homeowners.
Yet median income was ∂∂ percent below than the median of all elderly
homeowners, and HECM borrowers got more than π∫ percent of their total
income from Social Security payments, as opposed to ≥∫ percent for the
broader pool of older homeowners. Finally HECM borrowers generally had
few children, with more than π∑ percent reporting no children at all.

The Reverse Mortgage Market: Estimating Market
Potential
Five years into the pilot program in July ∞ΩΩ∂, HUD had issued only π,ΩΩ∂
HECM loans, despite being authorized for up to ≤∑,≠≠≠ (USHUD ∞ΩΩ∑).
The numbers have recently increased more rapidly, but in ∞ΩΩ∫ total issuance was still short of ≤∑,≠≠≠. While precise numbers are hard to ﬁnd, it
seems safe to say that when one adds up all reverse mortgages of all types
issued in the United States to date, a reasonable ‘‘guesstimate’’ would be in
the order of ∑≠,≠≠≠.
These small numbers stand in strong contrast to most estimates of market
potential. Of course an important preliminary step in analyzing the market
is to identify any powerful reasons that elderly households might have to
eschew home equity conversion. Two of the strongest reasons for avoiding
the market altogether may be a desire to move from the current home, and
a powerful bequest motive.
For an elderly household planning to move in the near future, a reverse
mortgage would seem to be a very bad idea, since the transactions cost alone
would take a huge bite out of the housing equity. However, for a household
planning to stay put, the calculus is very different. One may gain some
insights on market potential simply by studying the actual and anticipated
patterns of mobility for older homeowners. The most striking ﬁnding in this
respect is the profound desire of elderly homeowners not to move (Venti
and Wise, this volume). Roughly ∫≠ percent of households with the head of
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household aged ∏∑ or higher own their own homes, and the vast majority
have lived in the home long enough to pay off their mortgage fully. Having
lived in their current homes for a very long time, such households respond
to survey questions on the subject by stating a strong preference for staying
put for the rest of their lives.
A second possible motivation for avoiding the reverse mortgage market
is a strong bequest motive. Yet there is evidence that for households not
among the super rich, the bequest motive is far from powerful. Sheiner and
Weil (∞ΩΩ≤) ﬁnd that savings respond little to increases in the value of
housing equity, as they would if this equity was intended to satisfy a bequest
motive. They estimate that ∂≤ percent of households will leave behind a
house when the last member dies. For most of these the house will be owned
free and clear, and there will be few if any additional assets left in a bequest.
What a miracle it would be if the value of this house (which is at any rate very
hard to estimate ex ante) was precisely the optimal value of the bequest! No
wonder such bequests are typically referred to as ‘‘involuntary.’’
For households who intend to stay in their current home for life, yet do
not have an overwhelmingly strong bequest motive, the reverse mortgage
seems like a potentially important product. Even if one limited attention to
the most obvious category of potential borrowers, elderly homeowners who
are house rich, cash poor, and have no children, the numbers run well into
the millions. Unless they take out a reverse mortgage, these households will
die leaving their homes as an essentially unintended bequest. When one
adds back in the other elderly households for whom the product may also be
desirable, market possibilities seem robust.
The ﬁrst serious attempt to clarify market potential was offered by Venti
and Wise (∞ΩΩ∞) using SIPP data. They provided detailed summaries of the
wealth composition of the elderly and conﬁrmed that many elderly households live primarily on pension income. Then also found that housing equity
is the only asset available to potentially increase their consumption. To
estimate the quantitative signiﬁcance of housing equity, they annuitized the
entire net housing wealth with an actuarially fair life tenure reverse mortgage, and estimated the extent to which this could increase the household’s
annual income (or consumption). They estimated the median increase in
annual income from such an annuity at around ∞≠ percent.
Though these authors concluded that a ∞≠ percent income increase is
surprisingly low, their numbers are a long way from suggesting that the
market has no potential. Indeed Rasmussen et al. (∞ΩΩ∑) use essentially the
same procedure to show that even when attention is restricted to households ∏Ω or older with income less than $≥≠,≠≠≠, there are ≥ million who
would gain at least ≤∑ percent from the reverse annuity mortgage. The
potential for the reverse mortgage to raise consumption at the lower end of
the income spectrum is noteworthy. Housing equity is distributed in a far
more equitable manner across households than are the more liquid forms
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of ﬁnancial wealth. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study,
Mitchell and Moore (∞ΩΩ∫) show that the median net ﬁnancial wealth of the
highest income quintile is ∑∑ times as high as that of the lowest quintile,
while the equivalent ratio for housing wealth is π.∂. The importance of
housing equity for minority households is also proportionately far greater
than it is for white households.
In a second study, Venti and Wise (∞ΩΩ≠) posit that if there were a large
frustrated desire to reduce housing equity, then we should expect to see a
large number of older households moving to smaller homes. Empirically,
however, they ﬁnd that the actual number of movers is relatively low, and
among those who do move, as many increase housing equity as decrease it.
While this is an intriguing ﬁnding, it is not clear to me that it suggests little
interest in home equity conversion products. After all, some elderly households who buy more valuable houses are likely to be doing so to increase
housing consumption rather than housing equity. Furthermore, Sheiner
and Weil (∞ΩΩ≤) note that when one looks at the ‘‘older’’ old, there is indeed
a relatively quick decline in housing equity at the end of life. They also
provide evidence that much of the housing equity released in a house sale
gets used almost immediately for consumption purposes; see also Megbolugbe et al. (∞ΩΩπ) and Venti and Wise, this volume. This observation led
Skinner (∞ΩΩ∏) to hypothesize that the most important use of reverse mortgages may be to help release funds for emergency purposes, for instance if
there is a health problem. Housing equity maybe a potentially important
form of precautionary saving, but tends to be tapped when bad contingencies arise.
There is a second reason to downplay the signiﬁcance of the early Venti
and Wise (∞ΩΩ≠) ﬁndings for the home equity conversion market. Those
who move to more valuable houses late in life may not be typical elderly
households. Either they were wealthy enough to buy their house free and
clear, or they had incomes high enough to qualify for a mortgage. It is
plausible that such households would not be interested in reverse mortgages. On the other side, anyone without heirs, who dies without a will, and
who leaves a house owned free and clear to be sold at probate would seem to
have suffered unnecessarily low consumption, unless housing equity is enjoyed in and of itself.

Some Market Imperfections
Other explanations for why the market for home equity conversion is so
small pertain to high transactions costs and severe moral hazard problems.
Another set of impediments may arise from household uncertainty about
future medical expenses, and the connection between medical expenses
and the desire to move to a new home. Finally, we consider the potential impact of psychological issues, such as the possibility that older households are
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simply unwilling to take on debt of any kind except in the case of dire emergencies. Institutional barriers to market development are explored next.

Transactions Costs and Moral Hazard
The most obvious impediment to market development is the high level of
transactions costs. In the U.S. market, a π∑-year-old could end up paying
roughly $∏,∑≠≠ in fees to borrow a net amount of no more than $∂∞,≠≠≠ up
front on a home worth $∞≠≠,≠≠≠. This is rather a disappointing payoff, and
certainly the mere act of taking out this loan produces a signiﬁcant reduction in net worth. Given these high costs, it may not be surprising that many
households would leave what might otherwise be termed involuntary bequests. If the ideal bequest were somewhere in the $∑≠,≠≠≠ to $π∑,≠≠≠ range,
the household may be better off not taking out a reverse mortgage, consuming somewhat less than they would otherwise desire, and leaving a somewhat
excessive bequest, rather than paying the costs of entering this market.
A second economic problem with even greater signiﬁcance may be moral
hazard in home maintenance and in home sale. Those who apply for HECM
loans are generally very old, poor, and living in homes that are more valuable than they can afford to maintain, at least according to standard loan
qualiﬁcation criteria. They may also anticipate signiﬁcant health problems
during the life of the loan. These households would seem to be prime
candidates to let their homes fall into serious disrepair. Unfortunately, in
the reverse mortgage market, an initial failure to maintain the home properly can feed on itself, creating ever worse incentives for maintenance and a
growing problem for the lender. Deterioration in the property value combined with the inevitable increase in the size of the outstanding loan balance soon leave the homeowner with no ﬁnancial stake in the house. The
loan quickly hits a crossover point, and ∞≠≠ percent of any incremental
damage or depreciation to the house is borne by HUD. In practice, the
contracts contain a provision that declares that failure to maintain the
house constitutes a default on the loan. But will HUD try to enforce this
clause? Even if HUD should be so bold as to try to enforce the contract,
would the courts let them? As Rosenbaum et al. argue:
The contract provisions by which a reverse mortgage lender seeks to bind seniors to
home maintenance liability ﬂy in the face of reality. Enforcing such covenants may
ultimately be more bitter and expensive than they are worth, and in the circumstances, there is no assurance that they can be enforced. . . . Will a court ﬁnd that a
ninety year old widow, who years ago borrowed the last of her home equity, must
install a new twenty-year roof? . . . The responsibility of property-management and
maintenance cannot be displaced upon home owners as if they were ordinary borrowers in the prime of life, with good incomes and growing equity. . . . They are
increasingly frail, needing ﬁnancial assistance and spending down that home-equity
that would otherwise be their incentive to maintain the property. (∞ΩΩ∑: ≤≤–≤≥)
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Moral hazard problems extend well beyond the maintenance phase, as
Rosembaum et al. (∞ΩΩ∑) point out. It is predictable that in cases in which
the crossover point is passed before the homeowner dies, the sale will wind
up being handled either by relatives who have no stake in the sale price, or
by the probate court. It is well known that probate sales bring lower prices
than common home sale transactions, because of various problems and
restrictions such as sealed bids, statements of ﬁnancial qualiﬁcation, as-is
terms, court appearances, and delays. In addition, the court is exempt from
statutory disclosures required of other sellers, such as reporting known
defects, the history of improvements, and pending events or conditions.
Sale by a relative could be even worse than a probate sale, due to a combination of laziness and corruption (e.g. asking for some reciprocal economic
gain when selling the house at a bargain-basement price). If the reverse
mortgage lender sought to gain control of the sale process, the ﬁrst step
would be a costly and lengthy foreclosure proceeding.
Conﬁrmation that these problems are beginning to rear their heads may
be found in a memorandum of July ≤∂, ∞ΩΩ∫, submitted to HUD from the
Santa Ana Homeownership Center »www.hud.gov:∫≠/hoc/sna/snathc≠≤
.html…:
The purpose of this memorandum is to keep you abreast of a counseling issue
concerning the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage. Currently we are experiencing
an increase in the number of elderly home owners with a Home Equity Conversion
Mortgage that are unable to pay their taxes and insurance or maintain the condition
of their property. Failure to meet these requirements is a default under the terms of
the mortgage agreement. The HUD lender is required to notify HUD of this default.
We must make the home owner aware that they may consult with a HUD-Approved
Counselor. During this consultation, the counselor may assist the home owner in
submitting information to HUD or the lender that may assist all parties in reaching
a resolution.

The memorandum goes on to provide ﬁve suggestions on counseling the
homeowner on how to recover good standing. Aggressive enforcement of
the default clause does not appear to be in the picture. HUD’s upbeat
assessment to Congress on the sufﬁciency of the HECM insurance premium
was written a mere six years after the program was initiated, and it seems
premature.

Healthcare, Mobility, and Precautionary Savings
One danger for the borrower in taking out a reverse mortgage is that it may
interact very badly with a later health problem. There are several aspects to
this interaction. The ﬁrst is that having spent down equity at an earlier stage,
the household will enter the period of sickness in a somewhat worse net
asset position.
A second and more signiﬁcant issue concerns the interaction between
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health status and living arrangements. When an elderly person develops a
signiﬁcant health problem, it may be necessary to leave the home for some
time for treatment and convalescence. At such points, there is also an incentive to reconsider the optimal living arrangement (Feinstein ∞ΩΩ∏). For
many who are sick, it may be a good idea to move into more appropriate
transitional housing. If some of their housing equity has been depleted,
however, it may prove impossible to raise enough capital from selling the
existing home to make such a move possible.
Things may be even worse for elderly who develop major health problems
but nevertheless have a preference for staying in their current homes. Technically, such households are very likely to default on the terms of the reverse
mortgage, either by being kept in convalescence out of the home for too
long, or by falling behind on taxes or house repairs. At this point, the lender
has the right to force sale of the house. The risk of being evicted from the
home after an unfortunate medical stay may rationally deter many households from considering a reverse mortgage.

The Complex Psychology of Reverse Mortgages
It is often suggested that many elderly households are simply reluctant to
take on debt, having spent so much of their lives trying to pay off their initial
mortgage. Whatever the psychological origins of this discomfort, it turns out
to have a basis in reality in the case of the reverse mortgage. After all, the
reverse mortgage does involve a commitment to live in the house, and any
prolonged period in convalescence would place the household at genuine
risk of losing the right to live in the house. The mere hint of this aversive
future possibility may be sufﬁciently anxiety inducing to discourage all but
the most desperate.
Other possible dangers of the reverse mortgage market for elderly households have recently been highlighted not only by such consumer advocates
as the Consumers Union of the United States (Wong and Paz-Garcia ∞ΩΩΩ)
and the AARP, but also by HUD itself. There are cases of elderly households
being contacted by ‘‘home repair’’ companies offering to ﬁx up problems
with no cash down, if only the owner will sign the following small document.
The document turns out to be a reverse mortgage, in which the contractor
charges exorbitant fees.
Even more serious is the possibility that fear of being ‘‘suckered’’ into a
bad deal, or even fear of being evicted from one’s home after sickness,
inﬂuence the desire to avoid thinking about a reverse mortgage. As such, it
may be part of a broader pattern in which psychological factors play a role in
limiting the demand for reverse mortgages. Indeed there is evidence of
inertia in many decisions that are important to the quality of life in later
years. Lusardi (∞ΩΩΩ) shows that many households save very little for retirement and report not having given retirement much thought. To back up
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their claims, many of them report being unaware even of the level of their
social security beneﬁts.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (∞ΩΩΩ) characterize this form of ‘‘avoidant’’ behavior as following from a more general tendency to excessive procrastination when actions involve current costs and future beneﬁts. Starting from
very different theoretical viewpoints, the work of Becker and Mulligan
(∞ΩΩπ) and Caplin and Leahy (∞ΩΩπ) also suggests that households may be
especially unwilling to spend current resources to prepare for possible future unpleasant events. This means that aversive future events could be
highly discounted from the current perspective. At the most extreme level, a
low level of consumption in a house owned free and clear may be preferable
to a somewhat higher level in a house on which there is debt, with the
corresponding increase in insecurity.
Finally, we note that the counseling programs, while intended to provide
reassurance, may themselves be enough to discourage many households.
After all, the mere presence of the counseling program makes potential
applicants aware that there are complexities to the product that may possibly come back to haunt them at a later date. In the thin market that currently exists, most households may not know anyone who has a reverse
mortgage, so that there is no background of personal knowledge to help
allay worries about being evicted by an angry creditor. If someone known to
them took out the product for strong reasons of direct motivation, and if
their use appears successful, then neighbors may imitate. In this way, one
may get a form of gradual takeoff in consumption, in just the same manner
that one does in stories of technological diffusion. There may be a great deal
of social learning and imitation required for the market to grow.
Combining these various mechanisms produces a vision in which many
may be disinterested in reverse mortgages, at least until they appear to be
the answer to a pressing current problem. In this sense, the various psychological theories may provide further backing for the hypothesis that reverse
mortgages may be most important in providing funding for emergencies,
rather than for funding day-to-day consumption.

A Question of Supply
Powerful as they may seem, it is unlikely that the economic and psychological forces outlined above are sufﬁcient to explain the low level of use of
home equity conversion products in the U.S. market. The most straightforward supply-side factor that contributes to the low level of use of reverse
mortgage is the relatively low fee paid by HUD to institutions that issue
HECMs. These fees are insufﬁciently high to make aggressive marketing of
the HECM a worthwhile activity for most banks, helping to keep the program small.
Beyond this, the various market impediments outlined above such as
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transactions costs are largely endogenous. In a thick market, transactions
would be lower. Also, a signiﬁcant portion of these costs takes the form of
taxes, and these might be reduced if there was political pressure in this
direction coming from either side of the market. With respect to issues of
moral hazard, these may be far less signiﬁcant in a world with contracts in
which the lender had the incentive to carry out important tasks of maintenance. Similarly, healthcare concerns at the end of life could in principle be
handled by richer insurance contracts.
A larger point is that in a mature market, contracts would contain clauses
that could reduce most of the incentive problems and many of the psychological problems to manageable proportions. Combining this with the
strong incentives for some initial homeowners to use the products at time of
crisis, and the general spread of comfort that this history could induce, one
can imagine the market operating far closer to its theoretical potential than
is currently the case. In the end, there is simply an inefﬁciency involved in so
many individuals dying with assets in excess of their desired bequests. The
apparent lack of private sector interest in supplying products to exploit this
efﬁciency will remain mysterious, at least until we have explored the institutional environment.

The Fiscal, Legal, and Regulatory Environments
In addition to the economic and psychological forces that may impede the
development of the market, there are institutional impediments. The home
equity conversion market sits at the intersection of many different, confusing, incomplete regulatory systems. The incompleteness of these systems
impacts both the demand and the supply side of the markets, as is outlined
next.

A Few Lessons from History
Economists are not the only ones to have spotted the great potential of
reverse mortgage markets. In the U.S., much of the credit for the development of the market belongs to one individual, Ken Scholen. He founded the
National Center for Home Equity Conversion in Apple Valley, Minnesota, in
∞Ωπ∫, well before there were any reverse mortgages on the market. He has
continued to be a major ﬁgure inspiring public and private sector involvement on the supply side in this market. However, he did not take his idea
and make millions from it, as some might have in other sectors of the
economy. Instead, he recognized that the process of introducing these markets would involve politics.
The pitfalls on the road to building the market are illustrated by the
signiﬁcant number of commercial enterprises that have tried to start these
markets, without success. American Homestead was the ﬁrst U.S. company
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to offer reverse mortgages, starting in the mid-∞Ω∫≠s. This ﬁrm funded ∞∑≠≠
mortgages and then ran short of capital. Other private efforts to launch the
market were those of Providential and Capital Holdings. Capital Holdings
originated about ≤≠≠≠ reverse mortgages, but then it withdrew from the
marketplace when the housing market turned down in ∞ΩΩ≥. Providential
issued several hundred mortgages before running out of mortgage capital
in ∞ΩΩ∞. At this stage, Providential stopped making new loans, but continued to pay off existing loans and took applications for more. In ∞ΩΩ≤,
armed with qualiﬁed applicants and properties, Providential raised $∏∑ million in an oversubscribed public offering. All seemed to be going well for
Providential, and indeed its stock was appreciating. However at this point
the Securities and Exchange Commission announced an investigation into
the company’s accounting practices. In July ∞ΩΩ≤, it ruled that the company
should not assume any future changes in property value when projecting
cash ﬂows. More opinions led the SEC to revise its ruling in September ∞ΩΩ≤,
allowing the use of Monte Carlo techniques using a reasonable projection of
expected mean rate of return, as well as variation of individual around
market returns. But Providential’s shares never recovered after the initial
investigation, and the company has since withdrawn from the marketplace.

The Regulatory Minefield
Why might an accounting challenge be sufﬁcient to end Providential’s participation in the reverse mortgage market? Because it is merely the tip of the
iceberg in terms of the regulatory and institutional complexities surrounding reverse mortgages. Hammond (∞ΩΩπ: ∞π∑) gives some hints as to the
deeper complexities:
The laws governing the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests
in real estate are the mortgage laws of the state in which the real estate is situated. . . . On the other hand the rules governing the type of loans a lending institution is authorized to offer (including loans secured by real estate) are set by state and
federal regulatory agencies. . . . When state mortgage law and the rules regulating a
federal lending institution conﬂict or are inconsistent, generally the local, state law
will be applicable unless the federal law preempts the state law. . . . The fact that a
lending institution is authorized to make reverse mortgage loans does not mean the
elderly citizen of such a state can take advantage of this device.

The problems for reverse mortgages caused by the vagaries of state law are
profound. In its initial report to Congress, HUD was very concerned with
legal issues at the state level. In its followup report (USHUD ∞ΩΩ∑: ES-≤), it
noted that some progress has been made:
With respect to legal barriers at the state level, the Department ﬁnds improvements
since the previous evaluation, although obstacles do remain. . . . Texas, with the
homestead provision in its state constitution that prohibits mortgage lending except
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for certain speciﬁc purposes, is the only state where it is clear that no class of lender
may legally originate reverse mortgages.

To get to this happy state required a large scale lobbying effort to obtain
appropriate legal changes in many states. Speciﬁc enabling legislation had
to be passed in New York, Tennessee, and South Carolina. New York also
eliminated recording taxes, and Tennessee had to eliminate a ≤≠-year maximum for open-ended credit. Illinois went back and forth on whether or not
to eliminate a restrictive law. On the negative side, Minnesota determined
that mortgage bankers were not authorized to originate reverse mortgages,
and Texas fought hard to retain the constitutional provision that prohibits
lenders from making home mortgages for any reasons except to purchase a
home, to pay taxes on a home, or to ﬁnance repairs to a home.
But there is a far bigger legal issue on the horizon, one that concerns the
sale of property when the crossover point has been passed (USHUD ∞ΩΩ∑:
∑–∞≥):
The Department remains concerned about the uncertainty of state laws that may
affect enforcement of HECM as a ﬁrst mortgage. This is of particular interest to HUD
because enforcement of lien priority against other creditors becomes an increasingly
important issue over time as loan balances begin to exceed property values so that
some secured creditors might not be able to have their loans satisﬁed from the sales
proceeds. Most HECM loans will probably be assigned to HUD before this situation
occurs so that HUD has legal concerns not necessarily shared to the same degree by
originating lenders. . . . The laws in some states are not clear regarding the lien
priority to be granted to loan advances made over an extended number of years
under a mortgage that was recorded as a ﬁrst mortgage. HUD has attempted to
ensure that all HECM loan advances will be regarded under state law as mandatory
or obligatory advances that, under the law prevailing in most states, would also have a
ﬁrst lien priority, but there remains some legal risk in some states.

Hammond (∞ΩΩπ: ∞π∏) asserts more broadly:
a number of legal issues remain as a hurdle to reverse mortgages. These include
priority of liens, mortgage-recordation taxes, restrictions on terms and rates of mortgages, limitations on use of proceeds, and mandatory counseling requirements.

This is far from the end of the regulatory problem. The Federal Reserve
Board considers a reverse mortgage to be an ‘‘open end consumer credit
plan under which extensions of credit are secured by a consumer’s principal
dwelling.’’ Hence the Truth-in-Lending-Act applies, and the lender must
state ‘‘loss of dwelling may occur in the event of default.’’ Unfortunately, this
is not accurate: the household only stands to lose the property if it fails to
pay taxes, fail to keep the property in good repair, or otherwise endangers
the lender’s security interest in the property.
Legal uncertainty runs even deeper than this, since it is not clear what to
do if a household declares bankruptcy. How will bankruptcy law be applied?
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Further, what if there is a dispute concerning whether the household has
maintained occupancy? What happens when the occupants die, and there is
some wastage of the house in the meantime: is the family liable?

The Homeowner’s Perspective: Taxes and Benefits
Uncertainty about the implications of the reverse mortgage is felt not only
by suppliers, but also by homeowners. Indeed, while HECM requires borrower counseling by an agency approved by HUD, none of these agencies is
a law ﬁrm. It will not reassure borrowers that they must sign a certiﬁcate
disclosing that a HECM ‘‘may have tax consequences, affect eligibility for
assistance under Federal and State programs, and have an impact on the
estate and heirs of the borrower.’’ What speciﬁc tax issues arise? One question concerns the potential taxability of the proceeds of the reverse mortgage. While the IRS does not consider loan advances to be income, annuity
advances are in fact partially taxable. A second question concerns the possibility of a phantom gain that may occur when an elderly household sells
the home for a handsome capital gain, but at a time when the loan has
grown to be even larger than this. The end result may be a tax bill that the
household is unable to pay.
Rosenbaum et al. (∞ΩΩ∑) content that the uncertainties about the IRS
attitude to reverse mortgages run far deeper than this. They argue that a
reverse mortgage is a sale rather than a loan as a matter of legal deﬁnition,
given the high probability that the entire value of the house will ultimately
accrue to the grantor of the mortgage. While IRS revenue procedure Ω∞-≥
states that the service will not rule whether a particular structure shall be
construed as a loan or recast as a sale, there is a possibility that the IRS will
ultimately rule that reverse mortgages are sales rather than loans. Such a
ruling would have a disastrous impact on the ﬁnancial positions of the
supposed owners (Rosenbaum et al. ∞ΩΩ∑: ∂Ωn∂π):
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of ∞ΩΩ≥ introduces a new provision designed to
reclassify from capital gains to ordinary income the proceeds of transactions which
are, in effect, disguised sales marketed as loans. If applied to reverse mortgages, such
a reclassiﬁcation might minimize or eliminate the gains against which a senior’s onetime $∞≤∑,≠≠≠ exclusion would otherwise be useful. Gain would be converted to fully
taxable ordinary income, without exclusion.

The situation with respect to beneﬁts is almost as confusing. Currently,
it appears that social security and Medicare beneﬁts are not affected by
whether or not the household has taken a reverse mortgage (Scholen,
∞ΩΩ∏). But the situation with respect to the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) and Medicaid programs is far more complex, as described in Nauts
(∞ΩΩπ) and Hammond (∞ΩΩπ). In the federal SSI program, a loan advance
cannot affect one’s SSI beneﬁts if one spends the loan advance in the calen-
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dar month in which it is received. But if one’s total liquid assets at the end of
any month are above a very low limit, eligibility is lost. In addition, the
money received from an annuity can reduce SSI beneﬁts dollar for dollar, or
make one ineligible for Medicaid. Even these current complexities pale in
comparison with the possible scenarios regarding how these programs will
change over time.

Inertia in the Large
The inertial forces outlined above can have a devastating impact on the incentive of private sector investors to develop all manner of new products. The
inherent incompleteness of the surrounding regulatory environment makes
it very hard to design products that provide a company with a competitive
edge. The only way to reduce regulatory uncertainty to manageable proportions would appear to be through expanded public discussion of the
products and an effort to capture the attention of the important legislators.
Unfortunately this public discussion removes the incentive to innovate, since
contract clauses are so easy to imitate. These problems could be greatly
diminished if it were possible to purchase comprehensive insurance against
regulatory and legal uncertainty prior to introduction of the products.
Difﬁculties in obtaining patents on contracts imply that a ﬁrst mover can
emerge only if the innovator can establish brand name and a central role as
a market maker. But there is no reason to expect the ﬁrst few efforts at
product introduction to succeed. Even HUD is unsure as to the legal standing of reverse mortgages, despite sympathies among legislators and the
American Bar Association. This means that the only real test of the regulatory system is some form of product introduction, resulting in inevitable
challenges and problems, with the precise pitfalls varying from case to case,
from agency to agency, and from state to state. The ultimate rulings in these
cases will be public goods beneﬁting not only the innovator, but also any
imitators who choose simply to wait and see. In terms of a private sector
venture becoming a market maker, the presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, with their close access to politicians and cheap funding, will likely end
any such fantasies.
Powerful as these institutionally determined incentive problems are, they
do not fully explain the failure of the market to develop. Inertia on the
demand side is also a factor. The clearest evidence of the independent
importance of demand side inertia is the slow takeoff of the existing market
despite all the implicit and explicit federal subsidies. But the deeper point is
that institutions themselves are endogenous in the longer run. The presence of potentially huge gains from trade might be expected to produce
pressure to correct and to clarify the appropriate branches of federal laws,
state laws, and the tax code. Older households looking to increase consumption should encourage groups such as the AARP to seek changes in legal
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and regulatory barriers. So why isn’t this happening in the case of reverse
mortgages?
The psychological forces outlined above may be important if we are to understand the lack of demand side pressure for change. Of particular interest
are forces that lessen the political involvement of those who may, at some
future date, beneﬁt from a thick market. These are the forces that make it
uncomfortable even to contemplate going into debt except in an emergency.
At any given time, the only people demanding such a product are those with
a need for emergency funds, but they may have more pressing things on their
mind than lobbying for the necessary regulatory clariﬁcations.

Policies to Promote Innovation
The government has a long record as a promoter of innovation in the U.S.
housing ﬁnance market. Indeed two of the key products in the current
market, the ≥≠-year mortgage and the mortgage-backed security, were developed by the public sector. It is this interest in promoting innovation that lies
behind the policies promoting richer development of the reverse mortgage
market. Yet our analysis suggests that the reverse mortgage is unlikely to be
seen as a hugely successful innovation unless there is some change in federal
strategy. What changes in policy might speed up the development of the
reverse mortgage market and stimulate more rapid innovation in the stodgy
ﬁeld of housing ﬁnance?
The current method of federal intervention is to push agencies to create
the reverse mortgage market themselves. This strategy has both pluses and
minuses. On the plus side, by introducing a new product and following up
on the various regulatory and legal problems, this approach exposes the
hidden dangers that the regulatory and legal systems have in store for these
contracts. On the minus side, there is no evidence to suggest that government agencies should maintain a monopoly on product design. We sketch a
few possible variations on the reverse mortgage theme to illustrate the complexity of the various questions of optimal product design.

Alternative Products
Alternatives to the current reverse mortgage range all the way from such
minor changes as adding richer insurance features to the existing contracts,
through wholesale changes in the nature of the transaction, and from loan
to sale.
Contract enhancements and insurance features. The most obvious problems in
the current reverse mortgage concern moral hazard in home maintenance,
and homeowner uncertainty about future health care costs and the possible
desire to move to a new home. In principle, all of these could be better
addressed with only minor changes to the market.
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With respect to moral hazard, a ﬁrst cut at the solution would be to
include average maintenance expenditures directly in the reverse mortgage
price, at least once the crossover point is approached. Rosenbaum et al.
(∞ΩΩ∑) indicate how this could be done with relatively little expense. In fact,
it may enable the lenders to increase the principal limit factors, since it
removes the need to price in an efﬁciently low level of house maintenance
expenditures. It may be objected that this clause would worry homeowners,
since it would mean that they no longer have complete control over decisions on the physical maintenance of the home. Against this, they would no
longer be in danger of default or eviction based on their nonfulﬁllment of
the maintenance clause.
If a homeowner’s uncertainty about future health status were important,
then this too could be alleviated with the appropriate additional clauses.
One could add an optional insurance feature, whereby a wide class of possible health problems would give rise to payments sufﬁcient to enable the
owner to move to transitional housing if so desired. Again, the richer the insurance coverage, the more the market may ultimately take off, as the worries about this dangerous new product get replaced by relief at having additional margins of safety in stressful and costly future contingencies.
Outright sale. There are two different legal formats that could be used to
enable the owner to sell a home outright while retaining the right of abode.
One is the sale-leaseback discussed by Hammond (∞ΩΩπ), and other is the
remainder sale proposed by Rosenbaum et al. (∞ΩΩ∑). The sale-leaseback
arrangement is already in use in both England and France, although the
scale of the market appears small. Rosenbaum et al. point out that sales of
the remainder have an ∫≠≠-year history in English law.
There are strong economic arguments in favor of such arrangements,
since there is a once-and-for-all shift of responsibility for maintenance away
from the elderly owner. These also maximize the amount that the elderly
can earn from the house, since buyers always get the full value of the house,
rather than the potentially lesser amount of the outstanding loan balance. A
possible drawback of schemes based on a change of ownership is that these
may not appeal to most owners unless psychological issues are handled
carefully. There is a powerful belief that ownership per se is important, and
this may indeed turn out to be true if one does not take care of clauses such
as what to do when the resident falls sick. Moreover, the new owner has a
monetary incentive to drive the residents out of their home. Of course, over
time one could hope for standards to develop to prevent this, but there may
not be many early takers of such a scheme.
Shared equity schemes. A hybrid proposal would involve partial sale of equity
rather than only debt ﬁnance. One could imagine the use of shared appreciation mortgages, or some form of partnership contract along the lines
outlined by Caplin et al. (∞ΩΩπ). It is worth noting that the shared appreciation route is already being experimented with by Fannie Mae in its
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HomeKeeper product (with apparently limited success). One objection
from consumer groups is that the consumer may not understand what he is
promising to give up (Wong and Paz-García ∞ΩΩΩ).
This class of product may have tremendous potential to change the entire
landscape of housing ﬁnance, not just the last few years of life. The current
evidence strongly suggests that many households end up leaving a bequest
comprising the house and the house alone. Apparently many households
are reluctant to take any act to change their housing equity in late life, and
this may be expected to remain true even with better designed products on
the market. If this is so, then the best time to change the end of life level of
equity may be when the house is initially purchased. In a market dominated
by inertia, prevention can be better than cure.
Consider what would happen in an institutional environment in which
there were partnership markets, so that an individual never bought all of
the equity in the current home. Suppose that the household purchased a
$∞∑≠,≠≠≠ home for a total up-front cost of $∞≤≠,≠≠≠, and that correspondingly it owned a less-than-∞≠≠-percent share in the ﬁnal sale price of the
home. Suppose further that the household was never going to move out of
the house. Would the household feel that it was necessary to save an additional amount to compensate for the lower level of housing equity? Common sense backed by the evidence of Sheiner and Weil (∞ΩΩ≤) suggests that
the answer is no. The most likely outcome is that the lower level of equity
would feed directly into higher consumption during the lifetime, with a
corresponding increase in welfare.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
Current U.S. policy involves federal agencies taking the role of monopoly
product designer in the market for home equity conversion. However, given
the vast array of possible products that would allow for home equity conversion, a more enlightened federal policy may involve taking a more aggressive role in sweeping the regulatory mineﬁeld, while at the same time ensuring the strongest possible competition on the supply side of the market.
In order to play the minesweeping role as effectively as possible, one
important ﬁrst step could be for some federal agency to open the door to
innovative product designs, at least at the conceptual level. Well-thoughtout proposals could be encouraged either by direct payment, or by some
indirect method such as the offer of royalties should the proposed contract
forms be adopted. When proposals were gathered, the next stage could involve getting all relevant regulators and representatives of various branches
of the law together. They would be asked to identify the relevant aspects of
existing codes that might impact the performance of these contracts, and to
consider additions or changes that would clarify the standing of the proposed contracts. The end result would at least be announcements of regula-
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tory intent, or, ‘‘private letter rulings’’ on controversial questions, or even
direct changes in regulations.
The most ambitious policy would address the issue of home equity conversion for all households, not just for elderly households. As has been argued
elsewhere (Caplin et al. ∞ΩΩπ), increased use of equity ﬁnance may help
alleviate many of the current problems in the housing ﬁnance market, including affordability problems for younger home buyers. Of course these
richer markets in home equity conversion open far more subtle regulatory
questions. Why does the IRS view sharing of losses on the home as stripping
the owner of the right to take the mortgage interest deduction? What is the
legal deﬁnition of home ownership, and is this an economically sensible
deﬁnition? This is the uncharted territory that must be mapped out to
encourage large-scale and beneﬁcial innovations in the housing ﬁnance
market.
Note
∞. A complete discussion of the nature and motivations for the principal limit
factor can be found in Szymanoski (∞ΩΩ∂).
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